xistence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding,
since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently
in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the
existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is
compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely,
truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the
same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding
according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow
that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.'
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 3]
Whether an Angel's Power of Intelligence Is His Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages
of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds."
Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.
Obj. 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything
besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which
is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple
form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an
angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been
previously said (Q. 50, A. 2).
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the
angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh
unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler
nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter
is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of
intelligence.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels
are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore
substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
_I answer that,_ Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power
or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident
thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the
diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account
it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in
every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared
to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been
alrea
|