lthough he does not mean to assert it; hence
he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for
much labor." Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the
like are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense
has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common
usage of speech, when we understand something for certain, to say
that we "sense it." And hence it is that we use the word "sentence."
Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness
of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing
them. We have experience when we know single objects through the
senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (Q.
57, A. 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in
the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind;
although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the
sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed
to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the
true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy,
whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things
themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.
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QUESTION 55
OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE
(In Three Articles)
Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic
knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some
species?
(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as
they have derived from things?
(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the
lower angels?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 1]
Whether the Angels Know All Things by Their Substance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their
substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels,
according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are
happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence.
Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51;
_De Anima_ iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the
intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object
understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that
whereby
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