as it were by accident,
causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord
killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made
death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its
own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of
the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to
sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but
not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply Obj. 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to
the evil of fault.

Reply Obj. 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced
to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and
perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as
whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the
motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not
come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And,
likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not
caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

Reply Obj. 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as
the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary
for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 3]

Whether There Be One Supreme Evil Which Is the Cause of Every Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is
the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes.
But contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good
is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner
against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary principles,
one of good, the other of evil.

Obj. 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But
the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was
shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 2, 4). Therefore, also, there is a
supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.

Obj. 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil
and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what
is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to
some supreme evil.

Obj. 4: Further, everything