vation of good. In
another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter
makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final
cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.
But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that
is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For
every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as
an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some
good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside
the scope of our will and intention."
Reply Obj. 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are
ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and
according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was
said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good.
Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor
does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that
is, by reason of some good joined to it.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 2]
Whether Evil Is Found in Things?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For
whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of
something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from
non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.
Obj. 2: Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore
evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is
contrary to what has been said (A. 1).
Obj. 3: Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as
the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed
with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best,
much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is
no evil.
_On the contrary,_ On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and
penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 47, AA. 1, 2), the perfection
of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things,
so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of
goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of
goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this
grade is
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