ished by evil; but where
it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although
good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different
things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
Reply Obj. 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of
good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the
continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an
ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a
third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not
avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we
continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than
half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the
above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance
either equally or more.
Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite
thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not _per se,_ but
accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also
increased infinitely, as explained above.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 5]
Whether Evil Is Adequately Divided into Pain* and Fault?
[*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification,
being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain
of loss, Pain of sense."--Ed.]
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into
pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all
creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own
existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore
evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
Obj. 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor
pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are
evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
Obj. 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for
"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion
for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not
is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain
follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into
pain and fault.
Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that this division is
superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil
"because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil
comes under
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