things." But others said that corporeal things were
created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to
exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"--i.e. before
all things--"God created heaven and earth." For four things are
stated to be created together--viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal
matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of time,
not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but
because together with time heaven and earth were created.

Reply Obj. 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being
made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because,
since in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one
point in a given movement--that is, whilst anything is in the process
of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after,"
because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not
in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the term of
movement, as was said above (Q. 45, AA. 2, 3). Hence a thing is
created in such a way that it was not being created before.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists
of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to
some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from
it time begins.
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QUESTION 47

OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL
(In Three Articles)

After considering the production of creatures, we come to the
consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be
threefold--first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly,
of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of
the spiritual and corporeal creature.

Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) The multitude or distinction of things.

(2) Their inequality.

(3) The unity of the world.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 1]

Whether the Multitude and Distinction of Things Come from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of
things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one.
But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. 11, A.
4). Therefore He produces but one effect.

Obj. 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar.
But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as wa