ration of which
matters will be given later (Q. 75, A. 2; Q. 118, A. 6). But be it
noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one
might say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, as
an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in
general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 3]

Whether the Creation of Things Was in the Beginning of Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the
beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of
time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation
the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not
measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things.
Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that
everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies
a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is
indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be
created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not
created in the beginning of time.

Obj. 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be
created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the
beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things
was not in the beginning of time.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth."

_I answer that,_ The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to
exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and
that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the
beginning" are expounded--viz. "of time." And some said that there
are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of
evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded--"in the
Son." For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by
reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son
by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), "Thou
hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made
all things in the beginning--that is, in the Son; according to the
word of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), "In Him"--viz. the Son--"were
created all