s said above (Q.
44, A. 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not
diverse.

Obj. 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end
of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above
(Q. 44, A. 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:4, 7) that God "divided the
light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore
the distinction and multitude of things is from God.

_I answer that,_ The distinction of things has been ascribed to many
causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by
itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the
ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter,
attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction
of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter.
Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of
things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the
intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in
matter.

But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown
above (Q. 44, A. 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we
must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause.
Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the
form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their
proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account
of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is
formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.

Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents,
as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced
the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own
being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as
will appear later (Q. 50, A. 3). And so the first intelligence,
inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second
intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality
it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as
it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the
heavens.

But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it
was shown above (Q. 45, A. 5) that to create belongs to God alone,
and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God
alone--viz. all t