hose things which are not subject to generation and
corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the
universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the
first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such
an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore,
the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of
things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.
Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come
from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought
things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to
creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could
not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many
and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the
representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another.
For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is
manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together
participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it
better than any single creature whatever.
And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of
things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word
of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read
in Gen. 1:3, 4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the
light from the darkness."
Reply Obj. 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes
it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its
effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was
shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since,
therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand
many things, as was shown above (Q. 15, A. 2), it follows that,
although He is one, He can make many things.
Reply Obj. 2: This reason would apply to the representation
which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by
reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is
only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly,
which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by
many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the
plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of
things.
Reply Obj. 3: In speculative things the medium of
demonstration, which demonstra
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