e. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it
should be created; because creation imports a relation of the
creature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 4]

Whether to Be Created Belongs to Composite and Subsisting Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to
composite and subsisting things. For in the book, _De Causis_ (prop.
iv) it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a
thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking
does not belong to subsisting and composite things.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite
things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.

Obj. 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is
properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the
thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter,
and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting
composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.

_I answer that,_ To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was
shown above (Q. 44, A. 2, ad 2, 3). Now, to be made is directed to the
being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong
to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to
subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of
separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material
substances. For being belongs to that which has being--that is, to
what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like
are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because
something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its
subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a
being." Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting
things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought
to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas,
properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.

Reply Obj. 1: In the proposition "the