FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   429   430   431   432   433   434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441   442   443   444   445   446   447   448   449   450   451   452   453  
454   455   456   457   458   459   460   461   462   463   464   465   466   467   468   469   470   471   472   473   474   475   476   477   478   >>   >|  
an also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son. _On the contrary,_ In God "that which is possible," and "that which is" do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical. _I answer that,_ As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given. The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness. The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost. The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said (A. 2), and nature is determined to one. The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons. Reply Obj. 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son--that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   429   430   431   432   433   434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441   442   443   444   445   446   447   448   449   450   451   452   453  
454   455   456   457   458   459   460   461   462   463   464   465   466   467   468   469   470   471   472   473   474   475   476   477   478   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

reason

 

Father

 

person

 
manner
 

persons

 
generandi
 

subsistent

 
Persons
 

filiation

 
divine

gerundive

 
begotten
 
relations
 
proceed
 

Wherefore

 
proceeding
 

distinction

 

begetting

 

regard

 
similar

argument

 

differ

 
perfect
 

determined

 

nature

 

fourth

 

entire

 

perfection

 

contained

 

contrary


notional

 

follow

 

diminished

 
passive
 

taking

 

gerund

 
active
 

material

 
respect
 

multiplied


species

 
paternity
 

distinct

 
Fathers
 

reasons

 

matter

 
simple
 

things

 

naturally

 

understands