that the Father
is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as
from another by generation. And that the consequent relations which
are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of
a person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence, if these
relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the
persons, remain.

But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations
distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above (A. 2);
secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person,
as appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that,
"person is the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, to
have hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the
rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.

Reply Obj. 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing
property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all
of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing
property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as
subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing
property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer
remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature
removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances.
Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially
to both.

Reply Obj. 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a
person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow,
however, that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it
does not follow that He is not a person.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of
the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed,
as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of
the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being unbegotten"
says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But
he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being
is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the
Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other
persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as the Jews
understand it.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 4]

Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?

Objection 1: It would seem t