ce and three persons, as is clear from what
is above expounded (Q. 28, A. 3; Q. 30, A. 2). Therefore essence is
not the same as person.
Obj. 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same
things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and
negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct,
whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is
subject to essence; whence it is called _suppositum_ or "hypostasis."
Therefore person is not the same as essence.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the
person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the
Father."
_I answer that,_ The truth of this question is quite clear if we
consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3)
that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same
as _suppositum,_ which in intellectual substances is nothing else
than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while
the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains
its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), "relation
multiplies the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God
essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be
"adjacent"; considering only in the relations the idea of "reference
to another," and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown
above (Q. 28, A. 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in
God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God
essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons
are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated
(Q. 29, A. 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature.
But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom
really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an
opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that
opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.
Reply Obj. 1: There cannot be a distinction of _suppositum_ in
creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles;
because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God
relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between
them they distinguish the _supposita_; and yet the essence is not
distinguished, because the relations themselves ar
|