moved from
the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however,
appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri
Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 5]

Whether Abstract Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand
for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets
essence." For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and
the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken
singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence."

Obj. 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies
generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is
generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it
seems that the divine essence is generated.

Obj. 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear
from what is above explained (Q. 3, A. 3). But, as was shown, it is
true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true:
"Essence begets essence."

Obj. 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is
predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence
can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.

Obj. 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the
essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is
not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not
begetting": which cannot be.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the
principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by
begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the
Godhead.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets
itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,
since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.
Therefore the essence does not beget essence.

_I answer that,_ Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in
asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence
begot essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity
God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong,
because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into
account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of
its signification as above stated (A. 4). N