truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing
itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are
referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be
said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth
as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means
knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained
(Q. 24, A. 1), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to
possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son;
although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain
kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of
the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence
of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work
produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an
appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to
the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an
adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the
delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as
the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate
to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken
personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is the
begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But
taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun
"this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person,
nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically
treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person;
as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass." So, speaking in a
grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for
the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun
"this," according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify
Him."
_______________________

QUESTION 40

OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES
(In Four Articles)

We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or
properties; and there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether relation is the same as person?

(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?

(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons
leaves the hypostases distinct?

(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of underst