e not distinguished
from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.

Reply Obj. 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way
of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and
affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need
not suppose the other.

Reply Obj. 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of
created things, as above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 3). And since
created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of
the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called
"subjects," _supposita,_ or "hypostases." So the divine persons are
named _supposita_ or "hypostases," but not as if there really existed
any real "supposition" or "subjection."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 2]

Whether It Must Be Said That the Three Persons Are of One Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are
of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and
Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But
the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are
not of one essence.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be
confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius
(Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy
Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.

Obj. 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence.
It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.

Obj. 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the
essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it
does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one
essence.

Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say
that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia]," lest
we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the
persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the
oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three
persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]."

Obj. 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion
of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or
substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De
Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the Son
signifies