it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a
stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally
belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so
called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members
of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third
sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in
which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense,
"unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it
may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain
person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the
same nature is begotten. In this sense the term "unbegotten" can be
applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper
to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name
"unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another
person; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of
principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the
term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from another; and
not only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In
this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at all to the Holy
Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as a subsisting person; nor
does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it
is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another--namely, from the
Father.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9),
"unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus
it applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance
differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not
begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation
is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man" is reduced to
the genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality.
Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs
also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten
is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by
relation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.

Reply Obj. 4: In every genus there must be something first; so in the
divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from
another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is
to suppose the existenc