uced creatures not because He needed them, nor
because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of
His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there be light,"
to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that
it was good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also
found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly,
that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race,
accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 2]
Whether There Are Notions in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God
but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture
does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in
God.
Obj. 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the
essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern
the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither
can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for
instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can
what belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not
say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore
there do not exist notions in God.
Obj. 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions
as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for
they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely
simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We
recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three
properties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional."
Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God.
_I answer that,_ Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the
persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and
wherever there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the
concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your
kindness"--i.e. you who are kind--so when we speak of paternity in
God, we mean God the Father.
But, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 3, ad 1), the use of concrete and
abstract names in God is not in
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