ay absolutely that the Son alone is Most
High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the
glory of God the Father."
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QUESTION 32

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS
(In Four Articles)

We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;
and this involves four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?

(3) The number of the notions?

(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these
notions?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 1]

Whether the Trinity of the Divine Persons Can Be Known by Natural
Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can
be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of
God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said
many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo
et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"--namely, three--"we bring
ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all
things created." And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in
their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various
reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with
God, and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the
distinction of persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on
Rom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third
sign--that is, as regards knowledge of a third person--i.e. of the
Holy Ghost--and thus it is clear that they knew at least two
persons. Likewise Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and
reflected upon itself its own heat." By which words the generation of
the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated.
Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural
reason.

Obj. 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I believe
without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found
for any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity some
have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who
communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine
persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good
thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership." Augustine
proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11, 12) to prove