ond substance. If it is the
former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance
is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word
"individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since
second substances are the genera or species. Therefore this
definition is incorrect.
Obj. 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the
definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal"
would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing,
and species is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is
the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational
nature), the word "individual" which is an intentional name comes
improperly into the definition.
Obj. 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in
those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as
Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as
in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to
enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be
"essence."
Obj. 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of
the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not
properly defined as above.
_I answer that,_ Although the universal and particular exist in every
genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs
to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;
whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the
substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because
it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the
individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their
own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and
the individual are found in the rational substances which have
dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act,
like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to
singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have
a special name even among other substances; and this name is "person."
Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of
person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the
term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in
rational substances.
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