d
of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine
simplicity (Q. 3, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch
as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact
that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament
of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves
subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the
species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To
substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation
to the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.

Reply Obj. 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in
relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius
says (De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its
self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does
not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to
the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account,
therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and _ousiosis,_ or
subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of
substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 3]

Whether the Word "Person" Should Be Said of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said
of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to
say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity,
beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the
name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament.
Therefore "person" is not to be applied to God.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person
seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies
and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando],
since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the
mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called _prosopa,_ as they
were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes."
This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense.
Therefore the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.

Obj. 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word
"hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.
Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not
exist in Go