tone by one act, and by
another act understands that he understands the stone, and again by
another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of
understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the
relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He
understands all things by one act alone.
Reply Obj. 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it
does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in
God; but that God knows these many relations.
Reply Obj. 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real relations;
but are only logical relations (Q. 42, A. 3, ad 4).
Reply Obj. 5: The way from one term to another and conversely is the
same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we
cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the
same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of
something absolute, if there were such between them.
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QUESTION 29
THE DIVINE PERSONS
(In Four Articles)
Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the
processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the
persons.
First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then
comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons
absolutely first in common; and then singly.
The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four
points:
(1) The signification of this word "person";
(2) the number of the persons;
(3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto;
as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and
(4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.
Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:
(1) The definition of "person."
(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.
(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?
(4) What does it signify in Him?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 1]
The Definition of "Person"
Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by
Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient--that is, "a person is an
individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can
be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular.
Therefore person is improperly defined.
Obj. 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of
person, is either first substance, or sec
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