er, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of
being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of
power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus
of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being.
Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered
among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not
come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have
the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God."
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active
power, not to passive power, as was shown above (A. 1). Whence the
fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His
omnipotence.
Reply Obj. 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to
be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin,
because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says
(Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this
must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is
impossible--as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil
things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional
proposition should not be true, though both the an
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