hich it judges to be impossible." Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges
them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were
omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore
impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also
the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to
exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in
things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility.
Therefore God is not omnipotent.
_On the contrary,_ It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Luke 1:37).
_I answer that,_ All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that
God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is
said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v,
17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to
some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be
possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in
which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be
omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to
created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If,
however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all
things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle
in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying
nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He
is able to do.
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
It must, howev
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