the right reason of things contingent
concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many
things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to
providence.

Obj. 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to
the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God
in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and
left him in the hand of his own counsel" (Ecclus. 15:14). And
particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to
the desires of their heart" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore,
cannot be subject to divine providence.

Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God doth not care
for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the
same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under
the care of divine providence.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from
end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).

_I answer that,_ Certain persons totally denied the existence of
providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the
world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things
only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their
individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this
respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job
22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our
things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses,
however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on
account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in
reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the
opinion of the others.

We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine
providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual
selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an
end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the
causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the
effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference
towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than,
and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who
is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent
principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles;
not only of things incorruptible, but