ame way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
(Q. 19, A. 5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on
the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part
of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of
something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that
merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the
predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the
effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same
thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of
predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of
predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing
merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought
that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to
the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them
in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts
this opinion where he says (Rom. 9:11,12): "For when they were not
yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of
Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the
younger."
Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and
cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that
the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from
God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was
granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning
by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the
saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to
think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of
action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it
cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the
effect of predestination.
And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination
are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God
gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because
He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a
king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make
good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between
that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
if
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