t, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has
rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. I-II, Q. 57,
A. 6]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from
the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful,
nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards
an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God,
according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass
away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God.
Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of
things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any
inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to
which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who
worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).

Reply Obj. 2: Two things pertain to the care of providence--namely,
the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition;
and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the
first is eternal, and the second is temporal.

Reply Obj. 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes
the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done
for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the
moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed
towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do
with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the
divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one
and the same thing, as we have said above (Q. 19).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 2]

Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine
providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then
everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And
thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.

Obj. 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far
as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils
existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not
omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require
providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 5, 9, 10, 11): "Prudence is