ure; yet they are in keeping with the
plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields
to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the
corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it
is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides
universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit
certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the
universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much
good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live,
if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience
of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine
says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to
exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to
produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account
of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were
persuaded to consider corruptible things--e.g. casual and evil
things--as removed from the care of divine providence.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural
things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human
providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from
necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those
who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence,
attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
others of the ancients.

Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that God left man to himself, this does
not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that
he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one
effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon
as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of
themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like
rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is
significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the
very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily
follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must
be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included
under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause