also of things corruptible.
Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily
directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things
that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg. 'Those powers that are, are
ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas
often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt,
ordinata sunt.']" (Rom. 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence of
God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an
end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things,
inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject
to divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that
God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His
knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge
of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under
His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the
ordering of that art.

Reply Obj. 1: There is a difference between universal and particular
causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not
the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a
particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of
some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented
from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular
causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that
any effect should take place outside the range of that universal
cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular
cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that
cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no
effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the
meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance
circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has
purposely sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the
one knows not about the other.

Reply Obj. 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular
thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular
provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far
as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little
defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered.
Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be
contrary to some particular nat