.
God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more
excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything
happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that
love God, all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). But from
the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin,
He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His
providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they
were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the
reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of
divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.

Reply Obj. 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free will,
control over its actions, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is
subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something
is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it
accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way,
the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that
individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence;
as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 3]

Whether God Has Immediate Providence Over Everything?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all
things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be
attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he
should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his
subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence
over all things.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an
end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it
appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore
every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If
therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all
secondary causes would be withdrawn.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better
to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile
things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But
whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not
immediate providence over bad and vile things.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath He
appointed over the earth? or whom hath H