are justice and mercy?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Justice in God?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is
divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
neither therefore does justice.

Obj. 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does
not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).
Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But
God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice
cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards
the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to
God.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath
loved justice."

_I answer that,_ There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in
mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls
commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of
business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says:
"Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rom.
11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive
justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank
deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any
kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the
order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in
effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in
seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the
condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and
with the powers that properly belong to it."

Reply Obj. 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the
passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and
daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only
metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (Q. 20,
A. 1), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which
is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those
virtues. On the other