eply Obj. 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the
reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are
governed according to the law, it resides in the will.

Reply Obj. 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this
passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed
such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign
with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its
cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 3]

Whether Mercy Can Be Attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For
mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14).
But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.

Obj. 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot
remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13):
"If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself."
But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His
words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.

_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful and
gracious Lord."

_I answer that,_ Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen
in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which
it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful
[misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum
cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though
it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the
misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of
mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to
God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,
whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not
removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the
primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). It
must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains
not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality,
and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of
perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown
above (Q. 6, AA. 1, 4); in so far as perfections are given to things
in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been
already said (A.