ll short of
the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a
man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the
same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the
order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the
universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and
if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the
hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the
order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly
escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this
is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from
producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal
things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred
through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first
heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all
things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its
effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one
order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by
sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls
back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be
saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted
application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De
praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved
that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case
they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be
saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not
all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not
of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as
applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing
antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.

To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it
is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considere