tes
another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again
the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to
others; yet it implies no composition in God.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 2]
Whether God Loves All Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover
outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object
of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed
outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is
inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.
Obj. 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from
God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love
anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it
is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other
than Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, love is twofold--the love, namely, of desire, and
the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures
with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself.
Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship
with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2).
Therefore God does not love all things.
Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the
workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and
loved. Therefore God does not love all things.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things
that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
_I answer that,_ God loves all existing things. For all existing
things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a
thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it
possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q. 19, A. 4) that God's will
is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing
has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by
God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since
to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it
is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we
love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of
things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we
will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but
conversely its
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