that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the
cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in
wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse;
and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will
it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it
is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not
evil things.
_I answer that,_ Since the ratio of good is the ratio of
appetibility, as said before (Q. 5, A. 1), and since evil is opposed
to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought
for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the
intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be
sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in
each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some
other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the
corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is
food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means.
Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the
deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that
accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never
therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless
the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of
which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He
wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another.
Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of
right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or
of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils
are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things
to be naturally corrupted.
Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil,
yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil
is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This
they said because things evil in th
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