vil--namely, prohibition--and two--namely, counsel and precept--in
the case of good.
_I answer that,_ By these signs we name the expression of will by
which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may
show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of
another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either
directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when
he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is
his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing
of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental
mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He
declares his will by means of another when he orders another to
perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept,
and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of
counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the
same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will,
as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and
prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of
Matt. 6:10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That
permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from
Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the
Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually
doing it."
Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time,
permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good.
Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept
to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of
supererogation.
Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will
about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that
mean the same thing. Hence there is no reason why the same thing
should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of
prohibition or permission.
Reply Obj. 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His
will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said
to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing
to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good
pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the
same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not;
both because the former regards the present,
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