l it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
Obj. 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)
"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder
it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says
(Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God
imposes necessity on the things willed.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,
being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are
related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they
have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God
wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement
is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
necessary absolutely.
_On the contrary,_ All good things that exist God wills to be. If
therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
counsel, and all other such things.
_I answer that,_ The divine will imposes necessity on some things
willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign
to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary
causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes
contingent.
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause
is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause
can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if
the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the
divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better
therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the
divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect
follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to
its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power
in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since
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