ations as are their
natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits
inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of
operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus,
as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so
that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life
ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence
some are said to lead a life of self-indulgence, others a life of
virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the
active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 3]

Whether Life Is Properly Attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God.
For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as
previously stated (A. 2). But movement does not belong to God.
Neither therefore does life.

Obj. 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some
principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But
God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that
exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in
corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal
things.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God."

_I answer that,_ Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In
proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to
live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another,
the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect
is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a
threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the
agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form,
and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue
not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more
than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move
themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in
them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form
by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined
for