what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in
what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as
having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is
not distinct from His essence.
Reply Obj. 3: A will of which the principal object is a good outside
itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will
is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God
is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself
alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be
movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover
moves itself.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 2]
Whether God Wills Things Apart from Himself?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from
Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not
other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than
Himself.
Obj. 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the
appetite, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which
is impossible.
Obj. 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks
nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
Himself.
Obj. 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the
number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold,
and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is
impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification."
_I answer that,_ God wills not only Himself, but other things apart
from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
(A. 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and,
if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own
good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every
agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It
pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far
as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this
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