characterized the Atlanta campaign, I will now refer to an incident
of the operations about Dallas, it being next in order of date of
those I wish to consider. General Sherman does not allude to it
at all in his "Memoirs."

Near the close of the operations about Dallas, the Twenty-third
Corps was moved to our left, under instructions from General Sherman
to endeavor to strike the enemy's right flank. A division of the
Army of the Cumberland was ordered to "support" the Twenty-third
Corps. There were no roads available, and the country was in the
main densely wooded. The head of the column was directed by the
compass toward a point where our maps, the general topography of
the country, and the enemy's known position indicated that his
right must probably rest. After a laborious march through dense
undergrowth, during which our skirmish-line was lost in the woods
and another deployed to replace it, we struck an intrenched line
strongly held, and a sharp action ensued. The Twenty-third Corps
was deployed as far to the left as possible, and the skirmishers
reported that they had reached the extremity of the enemy's intrenched
line, but could not overlap it. At this moment the division of
the Army of the Cumberland came up in splendid style, and _massed_
immediately in the rear of our left, in "close supporting distance,"
and under a pretty heavy fire. I first sent a staff officer and
then went myself to the division commander, explained the situation,
and asked him to put in a brigade on my left and turn the enemy's
flank so as to give us a footing beyond his parapet. He replied
that he was ordered by General Thomas only to "support" me, and
that he would do no more. The day was already far advanced, and
before I could bring troops from another part of my line darkness
came on, and the action ended for the day. By the next morning I
had brought another division of the Twenty-third Corps to the flank,
and General Sherman arrived on the ground. By his personal orders
this division was pushed straight through the woods to a point in
the enemy's rear, on the road leading from Dallas to Acworth, which
point it reached without any opposition, and there intrenched.
That night Johnston abandoned his lines. An inspection of the
enemy's intrenchments demonstrated that our skirmishers were right,
and that a single brigade on our left would have been ample to turn
the enemy's flank and open the way to victory. The above