and men should be clearly informed precisely
what they are expected to do, and made to understand the necessity
for so great and unusual a sacrifice. In that case, brave and true
men will make the sacrifice required, provided their pluck holds
out long enough; and that no man is wise enough to predict, even
of himself, much less of a large number of men.

McPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA

The only chance of success was to invest Resaca on the west and
north, and put between the investing line and Dalton troops enough
to hold their ground against the main body of Johnston's army; and
this must have been done in a single day, starting from the debouche
of Snake Creek Gap, the troops moving by a single, common country
road. Johnston's whole army, except a small rear-guard, would by
the use of three roads have been in position to attack McPherson
at dawn of day the next morning, while the main body of Sherman's
army was far away on the other side of Rocky-face. Or if McPherson
had not held the entire natural position as far east as the Connasauga
River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems
to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken
and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain
that, however large his force might have been, he could have put
troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of
cutting of Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of
Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to
cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time
enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it
could not be done at all.

So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was
"Thomas's plan" to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the
road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have
succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise
of success, and therefore ought to have been tried. It is at least
probable that Johnston's view of the case (see his "Narrative,"
pages 15, 16, 17) is the correct one: That, with his thorough
knowledge of the ground, ample roads, and means of early information,
together with our ignorance of the ground and our extremely deficient
roads, he could have defeated any possible attempt to cut him off
from Resaca.

To illustrate the faulty system of organization and command which