hold a point on the road in rear of
Dalton, and _not_ to break the road and fall back as McPherson was
ordered to do. If Sherman had seen this clearly at the time, it
is inconceivable that he would have sent less than one fourth of
his army to execute the all-important part of the plan. And now
he judges McPherson as manifesting timidity ( 2) because he did
not at the critical moment attempt to accomplish, with his
comparatively small force, what Sherman should have ordered to be
done by a much larger force.

A very bold, independent commander might have attempted, whether
successful or not, what Sherman thinks McPherson ought to have done
at Resaca; and, as Sherman says, such an opportunity does not occur
twice in the life of any man. But McPherson was a subordinate in
spirit as well as in fact, and cannot fairly be charged with timidity
for not attempting what he was not ordered to do, and what, in
fact, was no part of the plans of his superior so far as they were
indicated in his orders.

If McPherson had assaulted Resaca, it is possible, but only possible,
that he might have succeeded. There were some cases during the
Civil War where intrenchments hastily constructed and imperfectly
defended were carried by assault; many more where the assault
failed; and, I believe, not one case where intrenchments carefully
prepared in advance, with obstructions in front, and defended by
a force commensurate with the extent of the line, like those at
Resaca, were successfully assaulted.

It is true that McPherson's force was vastly superior to the single
brigade that held Resaca that day, but that practically amounts to
nothing. A single division would have been as good for such an
assault as two corps. Beyond a reasonable proportion, say of three
or four to one, numbers amount to nothing in making such an assault.
It would be physically possible for numbers to succeed in such a
case if their immediate commander was willing to sacrifice them
and they _were willing to be sacrificed_. But considering the
general unwillingness among commanders and men to sacrifice or to
be sacrificed beyond what seems to them a reasonable expenditure
of life for the object to be gained, success is _morally_ impossible,
or very nearly so, in an assault such as would have been required
to capture Resaca on May 9, 1864. Clearly, such an assault should
not be attempted except as the only chance of victory; and then
the subordinate officers