t did not apply to, or limit, the expansion of Russia
in Manchuria. What caused this _volte face_ is not known; but it implied
a renunciation of the British policy of the _status quo_ in the Far East
and an official encouragement to Russia to push forward to the Pacific
Ocean, where she was certain to come into conflict with Japan. Such a
collision would enfeeble those two Powers; while Germany, as _tertius
gaudens_ would be free to work her will both in Europe and Asia[505].

[Footnote 505: In September 1895 the Tsar thanked Prince Hohenlohe for
supporting his Far East policy, and said he was weary of Armenia and
distrustful of England; so, too, in September 1896, when Russo-German
relations were also excellent (_Hohenlohe Mems_., Eng. edit., ii.
463, 470).]

On the other hand, Eckardstein, the German ambassador in London, is said
to have made proposals of an Anglo-German-Japanese Alliance in
March-April 1901. If we may trust the work entitled _Secret Memoirs of
Count Hayashi_ (Japanese ambassador in London) these proposals were
dangled for some weeks, why, he could never understand. Probably Germany
was playing a double game; for Hayashi believed that she had a secret
understanding with Russia on these questions. He found that the
Salisbury Cabinet welcomed her adhesion to the principles of maintaining
the territorial integrity of China and of freedom of commerce in the Far
East[506].

[Footnote 506: _Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi_ (London, 1915), pp.
97-131. There are suspicious features about this book. I refer to it
with all reserve. Reventlow (_Deutschlands auswaertige Politik_, p. 178)
thinks Eckardstein may have been playing his own game--an improbable
suggestion.]

In October 1901 Germany proposed to the United Kingdom that each Power
should guarantee the possessions of the other in every Continent except
Asia. Why Asia was excepted is not clear, unless Germany wished to give
Russia a free hand in that Continent. The Berlin Government laid stress
on the need of our support in North and South America, where its aim of
undermining the Monroe Doctrine was notorious. The proposed guarantee
would also have compelled us to assist Germany in any dispute that might
arise between her and France about Alsace-Lorraine or colonial
questions. The aim was obvious, to gain the support of the British fleet
either against the United States or France. A British diplomatist of
high repute, who visited Berlin, has declared t