orresponding advance of Spanish troops in the
North, a design to partition Morocco. Failing to secure what he
considered satisfactory assurances, he decided to send to Agadir a
corvette, the _Panther_ (July 1, 1911), replaced by a cruiser,
the _Berlin_.
[Footnote 531: Rachfahl, p. 310.]
[Footnote 532: Morel, App. XIV.]
Behind him were ambitious parties which sought to compass
world-predominance for Germany. The Pan-German, Colonial, and Navy
Leagues had gained enormous influence since 1905, when they induced the
Kaiser to visit Tangiers; and early in 1911 they issued pamphlets urging
the annexation of part of Morocco. The chief, termed _West-Marokko
deutsch_, was inspired by the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Kiderlen-Waechter, who thereafter urged officially that the Government
must take into account public opinion--which he himself had manipulated.
Again, as at Tangiers in 1905, Germany's procedure was needlessly
provocative if, as the agreement of 1909 declared, her interests in
Morocco were solely commercial. If this were so, why send a war-ship,
when diplomatic insistence on the terms of 1909 would have met the needs
of the case, especially as German trade with Morocco was less than half
that of French firms and less than one-third that of British firms?
Obviously, Germany was bent on something more than the maintenance of
her trade (which, indeed, the French were furthering by suppressing
anarchy); otherwise she would not have risked the chance of a collision
which might at any time result from the presence of a German cruiser
alongside French war-ships in a small harbour.
It is almost certain that the colonial and war parties at Berlin sought
to drive on the Kaiser to hostilities. The occasion was favourable. In
the spring of 1911 France was a prey to formidable riots of
vine-growers. On June 28 occurred an embarrassing change of Ministry.
Besides, the French army and navy had not yet recovered from the
Socialist regime of previous years. The remodelling of the Russian army
was also very far from complete. Moreover, the Tsar and Kaiser had come
to a friendly understanding at Potsdam in November 1910, respecting
Persia and their attitude towards other questions, so that it was
doubtful whether Russia would assist France if French action in Morocco
could be made to appear irregular. As for Great Britain, her ability to
afford sufficiently large and timely succour to the French was open to
question.
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