re was a struggle between the civilians and the soldiers,
which seems to have ended in a victory for the latter in an important
Council meeting held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29. Immediately
afterwards the Chancellor summoned Sir Edward Goschen and made to him
the "infamous proposals" for the neutrality of Great Britain in case of
a European War, provided that Germany (1) would engage to take no
territory from the mainland of France (he would make no promise
respecting the French colonies); (2) would respect the neutrality of
Holland; (3) would restore the independence of Belgium in case the
French menace compelled her to invade that country.

These proposals prove that by the evening of July 29 Germany regarded
war as imminent[553]. But why? Even in the East matters did not as yet
threaten such a conflict. Russia had declared that Servia was not to be
made a vassal of the Hapsburgs; and, to give effect to that declaration,
she had mobilised the southern and eastern portions of her forces as a
retort to a similar partial mobilisation by Austria. But neither Russia
nor, perhaps, Austria wished for, or expected, a European war[554].
Austria seems to have expected a _limited_ war, _i.e._ only with the
Serbs. She denied that the Russians had any right to intervene so long
as she did not annex Serb land. Her aim was to reduce the Serbs to
vassalage, and she expected Germany successfully to prevent Russia's
intervention, as in 1909[555]. The German proposals of July 29 are the
first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the
probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England,
might be involved while Holland would be left alone. In the course of
his remarks the Chancellor said that "he had in mind a general
neutrality agreement between England and Germany"--a reference to the
German offers of 1912 described in this chapter. As at that time the
Chancellor sought to tie our hands in view of any action by Germany, so,
too, at present his object clearly was to preclude the possibility of
our stirring on behalf of Belgium. Both Goschen and Grey must have seen
the snare. The former referred the proposals to Grey, who of course
decisively refused them.

[Footnote 553: M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government
on July 30 that late on July 29 Germany had ordered mobilisation, but
countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as to
England's attitude, and owing to