th a
view to preventing an unprovoked attack by the German navy. He explained
his conditional promise to M. Cambon. Thereupon Mr. Redmond promised the
enthusiastic support of all Irishmen. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, though
demurring to the policy of Sir Edward Grey, said, "If the Right
Honourable gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European
nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us that he is
going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support
him." Now, the Cabinet had by this time resolved that the independence
of Belgium should be a test question, as it was in 1870. Therefore,
there seemed the hope that not only the Irish but all the Labour party
would give united support to the Government. By the evening debate
official information had arrived; and, apart from some cavilling
criticisms, Parliament was overwhelmingly in favour of decided action on
behalf of Belgium. Sir Edward Grey despatched to Berlin an ultimatum
demanding the due recognition of Belgian neutrality by Germany. No
answer being sent, Great Britain and Germany entered on a state of war
shortly before midnight of August 4.

The more fully the facts are known, the clearer appears the aggressive
character of German policy. Some of her Ministers doubted the
advisability of war, and hoped to compass their ends by threats as in
1909 and 1913; but they were overborne by the bellicose party on or
shortly before July 29. Whether the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, or the
General Staff is most to blame, it is idle to speculate; but German
diplomacy at the crisis shows every sign of having been forced on by
military men. Bethmann-Hollweg was never remarkable for breadth of view
and clearness of insight; yet he alone could scarcely have perpetrated
the follies which alienated Italy and outraged the sentiments of the
civilised world in order to gain a few days' start over France and stab
her unguarded side. It is a clumsy imitation of the policy of
Frederick in 1756.

As to the forbearance of Great Britain at the crisis, few words are
needed. In earlier times the seizure of British ships and their cargoes
(August 1) would have led to a rupture. Clearly, Sir Edward Grey and his
colleagues clung to peace as long as possible. The wisdom of his
procedure at one or two points has been sharply impugned. Critics have
said that early in the crisis he should have empowered Sir George
Buchanan, our ambassador at Petrograd, to join Ru