ssia and France in a
declaration of our resolve to join them in case of war[560]. But (1) no
British Minister is justified in committing his country to such a course
of action. (2) The terms of the Ententes did not warrant it. (3) A
menace to Germany and Austria would, by the terms of the Triple
Alliance, have compelled Italy to join them, and it was clearly the aim
of the British Government to avert such a disaster. (4) On July 30 and
31 Grey declared plainly to Germany that she must not count on our
neutrality in all cases, and that a Franco-German War (quite apart from
the question of Belgium) would probably draw us in[561].
[Footnote 560: British White Paper, Nos. 6, 24, 99; Russian Orange Book,
No. 17.]
[Footnote 561: British White Paper, Nos. 101, 102, 111, 114, 119. I
dissent from Mr. F.S. Oliver (_Ordeal by Battle,_ pp. 30-34) on the
question discussed above. For other arguments, see my _Origins of the
War,_ pp. 167-9. The ties binding Roumania to Germany and Austria were
looser; but anything of the nature of a general threat to the Central
Powers would probably have ranged her too on their side.]
Sir Edward is also charged with not making our intentions clear as to
what would happen in case of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.
But he demanded, both from France and Germany, assurances that they
would respect that neutrality; and on August 1 he informed the German
ambassador in London of our "very great regret" at the ambiguity of the
German reply. Also, on August 2 the German ambassador at Brussels
protested that Belgium was quite safe so far as concerned Germany[562].
When a great Power gives those assurances, it does not improve matters
to threaten her with war if she breaks them. She broke them on August 3;
whereupon Grey took the decided action which Haldane had declared in
1912 that we would take. The clamour raised in Germany as to our
intervention being unexpected is probably the result of blind adherence
to a preconceived theory and of rage at a "decadent" nation daring to
oppose an "invincible" nation. The German Government of course knew the
truth, but its education of public opinion through the Press had become
a fine art. Therefore, at the beginning of the war all Germans believed
that France was about to invade Belgium, whereupon they stepped in to
save her; that the Eastern Colossus had precipitated the war by its
causeless mobilisation (a falsehood which ranged nearly all German
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