the two Central Empires harmonised only respecting the Eastern
Question. _Weltpolitik_ in general and Morocco in particular did not in
the least concern Austria. Further, the designs of Vienna and Rome on
Albania clashed hopelessly. An effort was made in the Triple Alliance,
as renewed in 1912, to safeguard Italian interests by insisting that, if
Austria gained ground in the Balkans, Italy should have "compensation."
The effort to lure the Government of Rome into Balkan adventures
prompted the Austrian offer of August 9, 1913, for joint action against
Servia. Italy refused, alleging that, as Servia was not guilty of
aggression, the Austro-Italian Alliance did not hold good for such a
venture. Germany also refused the Austrian offer--why is not clear.
Austria was annoyed with the gains of Servia in the Peace of Bukharest,
for which Kaiser William was largely responsible. Probably, then, they
differed as to some of the details of the Balkan settlement. But it is
far more probable that Germany checked the Austrians because she was not
yet fully ready for vigorous action. The doctrine of complete
preparedness was edifyingly set forth by a well-informed writer,
Rohrbach, who, in 1912, urged his countrymen to be patient. In 1911 they
had been wrong to worry France and England about Morocco, where German
interests were not vital. Until the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways had
neared their goals, Turkish co-operation in an attack on Egypt would be
weak. Besides, adds Rohrbach, the Kiel-North Sea Canal was not ready,
and Heligoland and other coast defences were not sufficiently advanced
for Germany confidently to face a war with England. Thanks to the
Kaiser, the fleet would soon be in a splendid condition, and then
Germany could launch out boldly in the world. The same course was urged
by Count Reventlow early in 1914. Germany must continue to arm, though
fully conscious that she was "constructing for her foreign politics and
diplomacy, a Calvary which _nolens volens_ she would have to
climb[547]."

[Footnote 547: Rohrbach, _Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt_ (1912), p.
216 (more than 10,000 copies of this work were sold in a year);
Reventlow, _Deutschlands auswaertige Politik,_ p. 251.]

Other evidence, especially from Bernhardi, Frobenius, and the works of
the Pan-German and Navy Leagues, might be quoted in proof of Germany's
design to begin war when she was fully prepared. Now, the immense sums
voted in the War Budget of 1913 had