tem, were beaten by 496 votes to 77, whereupon some of
them resorted to obstructive tactics, and the measure was carried with
some difficulty on July 8. The General Confederation of Labour and the
Anarchist Congress both announced their resolve to keep up the
agitation in the army against the three years' service. Mutinous
symptoms had already appeared. The military equipment of the French army
was officially admitted to be in an unsatisfactory state during the
debate of July 13, 1914, when it appeared that France was far from ready
for a campaign. The peace strength of the army was then reckoned at
645,000 men.
[Footnote 544: The _Temps_ of March 30, 1913, estimated that Germany
would soon have 500,000 men in her first line, as against 175,000
French, unless France recurred to three years' service. See M. Sembat,
_Faites un Roi, si non faites la Paix._]
In Russia in 1912 the chief efforts were concentrated on the navy. As
regards the army, it was proposed in the Budget of July 1913 to retain
300,000 men on active service for six months longer than before, thus
strengthening the forces, especially during the winter months. Apart
from this measure (a reply to that of Germany) no important development
took place in 1912-14. The peace strength of the Russian army for Europe
in 1914 exceeded 1,200,000[545]. That of Austria-Hungary exceeded
460,000 men, that of Italy 300,000 men. Consequently the Triple Entente
had on foot just over 2,000,000 men as against 1,590,000 for the Triple
Alliance; but the latter group formed a solid well-prepared block, while
the Triple Entente were separate units; and the Russian and British
forces could not be speedily marshalled at the necessary points on the
Continent. Moreover, all great wars, especially from the time of
Frederick the Great, have shown the advantage of the central position,
if vigorously and skilfully used.
[Footnote 545: G. Alexinsky, _La Russie et la guerre_, pp. 83-88.]
In these considerations lies the key to the European situation in the
summer of 1914. The simmering of fiscal discontent and unsated military
pride in Germany caused general alarm, especially when the memories of
the Wars of Liberation of 1813-14 were systematically used to excite
bellicose ardour against France. Against England it needed no official
stimulus, for professors and teachers had long taught that "England was
the foe." In particular preparations had been made in South-West Africa
for sti
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