ssion upon Germany." But we must oppose a
violation of the neutrality of Belgium, and, if the naval competition
continued, we should lay down two keels to Germany's one. As a sequel to
these discussions the two Governments discussed the basis of an Entente.
It soon appeared that Germany sought to bind us almost unconditionally
to neutrality in all cases. To this the British Cabinet demurred, but
suggested the following formula:

The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and
friendship between them, England declares that she will
neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon
Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and
forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to
which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to
anything that has such an object.

Further than this it refused to go; and Mr. Asquith in his speech of
October 2, 1914, at Cardiff thus explained the reason:

They [the Germans] wanted us to go further. They asked us to
pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of
Germany being engaged in war, and this, mark you, at a time
when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive
and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea. They
asked us (to put it quite plainly) for a free hand, so far as
we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to
overbear, to dominate, the European World. To such a demand,
but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we
gave[537].

[Footnote 537: See _Times_ of October 3, 1914, and July 20, 1915 (with
quotations from the _North German Gazette_). Bethmann-Hollweg declared
to the Reichstag, on August 19, 1915, that Asquith's statement was
false; but in a letter published on August 26, and an official statement
of September 1, 1915, Sir E. Grey convincingly refuted him.]

Thus, efforts for a good understanding with Germany broke down owing to
the exacting demands of German diplomacy for our neutrality in all
circumstances (including, of course, a German invasion of Belgium).
Thereupon she proceeded with a new Navy Act (the fifth in fourteen
years) for a large increase in construction[538].

[Footnote 538: Castle and Hurd, _German Naval Power_, pp. 142-152.]

Perhaps Germany would have been more conciliatory if she had foreseen
the events of the following autumn. As has already appeared, Italy's
att